The 2008 financial crisis, originated by securitization of sub-prime mortgage loans, had a huge impact on U.S. financial institutions and markets. We hypothesize that due to this crisis, the commercial banking industry has changed their portfolio structures and risk-taking behavior. To shed light on the response of U.S. banks to the 2008 financial crisis, we use the non-parametric approach to measure and compare the overall efficiency of large U.S. banks pre-and post-2008 financial crisis. We then decompose the overall measure of efficiency into allocative, overall technical, pure technical, and scale efficiency measures to better understand the sources of banking inefficiencies. The results indicate that large U.S. banks indeed changed their portfolios structure, and the efficiency of large commercial banks in the United States declined substantially during the financial crisis. Although it has been recovering since then, it still has not reached to the pre-crisis efficiency level.
INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis of 2008 was created by the real estate sector of the U.S. economy through introduction of the sub-prime rate, relaxed methods taken by banks in the process of the credit evaluation of applicants, the expansion of mortgage backed securities, and the introduction of exotic financial instruments. As the result of the 2008 financial crisis, financial markets collapsed, housing prices plummeted, and bankruptcies and foreclosures increased drastically. Following this crisis, many banks and other financial institutions in the United States and abroad faced considerable liquidity pressure, which resulted in higher than usual default risk on non-performing assets. This phenomenon pressed policymakers in the United States to intervene in market through the introduction of the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
The aim of this paper is to examine the potential effects of the 2008 financial crisis on the behavior of commercial banks following the crisis at least for two reasons. First, we believe that in response to the 2008 financial crisis, banks repositioned their portfolio of earning assets by focusing on less risky assets to avoid further financial problems and insolvency. We argue that this repositioning affected the production process of large banks, as well as their efficiency. Second, as Assaf et al. (2019) demonstrated, the high cost efficiency of banks is associated with good management, and the high cost efficiency of banks during normal times helps reduce failure probabilities and decrease risk subsequent to the financial crisis. This study supports the above assertions, as increased understanding of the impact of financial crisis on banks' cost efficiency may help policymakers better protect the banking system from the negative impact of a potential future financial crisis. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to measure the efficiency of large U.S. banks during preand post-2008 global financial meltdown time periods to shed light on the impact of the crisis on the efficiency of large banks. Results indicate that in response to the 2008 crisis, large U.S. banks modified their assets and liability portfolios. Further, there was statistically significant reduction in the cost efficiency of large U.S. commercial banks in the post-crisis period when compared to the pre-crisis period. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of literature. Section 3 explains the data, while Section 4 discusses the input and output variables and the linear programming methodology used in the study. Section 5 describes the empirical results, and Section 6 presents a summary and conclusions.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
During the last two and half decades, there have been numerous cost efficiency studies using banking data from all parts of the world. Concerning the study of cost efficiency in U.S. banking, researchers have used different methodologies, time periods, corporate structures, sizes, and combinations of inputs and outputs to answer a variety of cost efficiency questions. A few of these studies conducted in the 1990s include Aly et al. (1990) , Hunter and Timme (1991) , Berger (1993) , Mehdian (1990 and 1995) Surprisingly, despite the importance of the impact of financial crisis on banking cost efficiency, we are not aware of any study that examined the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the cost efficiency of U.S. banks. However, there are a limited number of studies that examine the impact of financial crisis on bank efficiency using banking data from other countries. Isik and Hassan (2003) examined the response of Turkish banks to the 1994 financial crisis in Turkey. They report that the 1994 financial crisis in Turkey resulted in a 17% reduction in banking productivity, of which 10% was attributed to technical regress and the remaining 7% was due to efficiency decline. Maredza 
DATA
The data for this study was collected from the bank "Call Report," published by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/) on the website "FFIEC Central Data Repository's Public Data Distribution." The data covers a period of 12 years from 2005 to 2016. We excluded four years, from 2009 to 2012 from the data, as this period is considered to be the crisis period and a necessary transitionary period for banks following the 2008 financial crisis. Additionally, we limited our results only to large U.S. banks, those with total assets of 2 billion USD or higher for two reasons: (1) the portfolio of liabilities and assets (source and uses of funds) of large and small banks are different, and (2) because of that, the large banks should respond faster and stronger to a major financial crisis. The final data set containing the information on the banks presented in Table 1 .
INPUT AND OUTPUT VARIABLES AND THE METHODOLOGY

Variables
We define inputs and outputs using the intermediation approach, in which the bank is assumed to convert three inputs into four outputs. We define the input, price of input, outputs, and total costs as follows: X1 = Number of full-time equivalent employees; X2 = Premises and fixed assets; X3 = Total liabilities; P1 = Unit price of labor = Wages & benefits expenses / # of full-time equivalent employees; P2 = Unit price of fixed assets = Total expenses of fixed assets / Total fixed assets; P3 = Unit price of interest = Total interest expenses / Total interest-bearing liabilities; Y1 = Commercial and industrial loans; Y2 = Real estate loans; Y3 = Other loans; Y4 = Total investment securities; TC = Total cost, the sum of total interest expense and total noninterest expense; TA = Total assets, same as included in the bank's balance sheet.
Efficiency Indices
We computed several efficiency indices for each bank from the period between 2005 and 2016, excluding 2009 to 2012, using the non-parametric methodology introduced by Farrell (1957), Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1985) , and Turk-Ariss, Rezvanian, and Mehdian (2007). This methodology involves solving several linear programs using data on inputs, outputs, input prices, total cost, and total assets data. The solutions of linear programs and derivations of the results provide us with overall efficiency (OE), allocative efficiency (AE), overall technical efficiency (OTE), pure technical efficiency (PTE), and scale efficiency (SE). Specifically, for a given bank, k, we can write the following ratios:
To compute the OE empirically for bank k in year t, we first solve the following linear programming (LP1) to find the minimum potential total cost: Where k = 1, ..., K is number of banks in the sample, P, X, and Y are as defined earlier, and z is the intensity factor.
Given the solution of LP1, the OE for bank k is found using the following ratio:
In order to estimate OTE for the k th bank, a new linear program (LP2), given below is solved:
The calculated OTE, δ, measures for bank k's overall technical efficiency under the assumption that the bank operates at constant returns to scale in the production process.
In order to compute PTE (denoted by ψ) for bank k, LP2 is solved with an additional constraint as and replacing by ψ. Then, SE for bank k is obtained by the ratio in (3):
Bank k is called scale efficient if SEk = 1. It follows if 0 ≤ SEk < 1, k is called inefficient. In order to identify the source of scale inefficiency of bank k, we resolve LP3 after replacing by and by ω. To facilitate the comparison of efficiency indices between pre-crisis and post-crisis, we use the following approach in the process of calculating efficiency indices: 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As described previously, this study uses data obtained from the balance sheets of a sample of large U.S. banks from 2005 to 2016. Because the purpose of the study was to examine the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the efficiency measures of large banks, we divided the period of study into three distinct subperiods: (1) pre-crisis (2005-2008), (2) crisis (2009-2012), and (3) post-crisis (2013-2016). We removed the crisis period from the study because we believe this period is not representative of typical banking environment and isolating this period allowed us to have a more unbiased picture of the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on bank efficiency. Table 1 displays the annual descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study for the pre-crisis (2005-2008) and post-crisis (2013-2016) periods. Comparing the raw data from the pre-and post-crisis periods reveals some worthwhile information; that is, the average percentage of earning assets (nonearning assets) to total assets has been lower (higher) in post-crisis period when compared to the pre-crisis period. This is expected since banks were not willing to invest in earning assets in post-crisis period due to high systematic risk. Although the mix of portfolio of earning assets have been stable, the share of real estate loans in portfolios of earning assets has been consistently lower in post-crisis period compared with the pre-crisis period. It seems that in response to the 2008 crisis, large banks became more conservative by holding less liquid (earning) assets and real estate loans. Again, this is an expected response since the major source of the 2008 financial crisis was long-term real estate loans.
The next obvious reaction by large banks has been a steady reduction in the number of full-time equivalent employees, with a simultaneous increase in the average salary and wages of the remaining employees. The combination of the lower number of employees accompanied by higher salary and wages per employee resulted in a steady increase in labor cost per unit of earning assets. Furthermore, the amount of interest paying liability has been increasing since the crisis, but at the same time, the interest cost of these liabilities has been declining sharply so that the combinations of larger interest paying liabilities accompanied by historically lower costs of borrowing result in a much lower cost of sources of funds in the post-crisis period.
Concerning the unit cost of fixed assets, the unit cost of fixed assets has been steadily higher in pre-crisis period, and this ratio has been declining since 2013. The cumulative impact of the lower cost of borrowing and fixed assets, accompanied by a lower level of employment and high wages and salary per employee has resulted in a lower cost per unit of output in the post-crisis period. Overall, the preliminary cost per unit of output analysis from the raw data in response to the 2008 financial crisis is not surprising, but rather reaffirms the common reaction of financial institutions to the economic crisis; that is, reduce the number of employees but increase the quality of labor force by hiring highlyeducated, expensive employees, take advantage of lower market rates, and limit the use of fixed assets.
Using the pooled data provided in Table 1 and linear programs 1-3 presented in the methodology section, we calculated five different measures of efficiency for each bank relative to the efficient frontier. The average and descriptive statistics of the efficiency measures relative to the pooled sample efficient frontier is given in Table 2 . The mean values of all efficiency measures, except scale efficiency (SE), are very low compared with their historical values reported in previous studies. For example, the overall measure of efficiency for the period is only 39.8%. This low overall efficiency measure is the result of low allocative and overall technical efficiencies. Concerning the volatility of the efficiency measure, we used two proxies: standard deviation and the range of efficiency measures. As evident from Table 2 , both measures of volatility indicate the major cause of high volatility in overall efficiency is the result of high volatility in AE rather than OTE and its components (PTE and SE).
To better understand the negative impact of the 2008 financial crisis on large U.S. banks' efficiency measures and its high volatility, we divided efficiency results into pre-and post-crisis periods. Tables 3 and 4 present the descriptive statistics of efficiency measures relative to the pooled sample efficient frontier for the periods of pre-and post-crisis, respectively. As evident from Table 3 , the average OE measure of efficiency of large banks in the precrisis period was 0.638. This level of efficiency is very similar to the findings of comparable studies. The major cause of overall inefficiency during this period was the low level of AE (0.737) rather than OTE (0.863). The high level of OTE in turn is the result of both high levels of PTE (0.907) and SE (0.952). A review of Table 4 provides a different picture on the efficiency values for the post-crisis period. The overall efficiency measure for the post-crisis period is only 37.8%, which is significantly lower than the historical value reported by other studies for the pre-crisis period. The major cause for the low level of OE during this period has been the decline in both AE and OTE; however, a sharp decline in AE (from 0.737 to 0.474) is more noticeable. The differences between means of efficiency measures in pre-and post-crisis are all significant at the 1% level. Concerning the volatility of efficiency measures, both the average standard deviation and the range of the OE (and its components AE and OTE) are higher than the corresponding values for the pre-crisis period.
To examine the trend of changes in efficiency measures in pre-and postcrisis periods, we present the yearly efficiency measure along with the descriptive statistics for the period of study in Table 5 . As shown in Table 5 , the overall efficiency measure and its components (AE and OTE) has been increasing during the pre-crisis period. However, there was a sharp decline in OE during the crisis period of 2009 to 2012, caused by a sharp decline in AE. This decline in efficiency measures (OE and AE) persisted in the period of post-crisis until 2016. We also examined the volatility of efficiency measures. It is evident from Table 5 that both the standard deviation and the range of overall efficiency measures are much higher in the post-crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. The higher volatility of OE measures in the post-crisis period is the result of higher volatility in AE than OTE and its components (PTE and SE).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we used the raw data to compare portfolios of assets and liabilities of large U.S. banks from the pre-crisis (2005-2008) and post-crisis (2013-2016). We also used a non-parametric approach to calculate overall efficiency measures of large U.S. banks during pre-and post-2008 financial crisis. We then decomposed the overall measure of efficiency into allocative and overall technical, pure technical, and scale efficiency measures to determine the sources of inefficiencies. We focused on large U.S. bank performance, and compared and contrasted their performance pre-and post-2008 financial crisis. We hypothesized that due to this crisis large U.S. commercial banks repositioned their portfolio of assets and liabilities toward less risky holdings, which in turn impacted their efficiencies.
Our results indicate large U.S. banks modified their portfolios of assets and liabilities in response to the 2008 financial crisis. Further, the results indicate that before the 2008 financial crisis, large U.S. banks had high levels of cost efficiencies compared to levels reported in previous studies. The financial crisis of 2008 resulted in a sharp decline in banking efficiency, which has been stabilized since then, but still has not reached to the pre-financial crisis level. These findings have important policy implications that the policy makers who are responsible for the stability of banking system should carefully monitor the cost efficiency of banks during the normal economic times to better prepared for the future financial crisis that negatively impact banks cost efficiency and may lead to financial instability. 26 
